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British whaling policy in the 1970s
Y6HJ=>GD S6C696
Abstract: The United Kingdom conducted pelagic whaling in the Antarctic
Ocean until the mid-s and took a moderate position in the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) after its establishment in . The UK’s stance
changed in , when the government supported a -year moratorium on
commercial whaling at the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment as well as the IWC. The UK has consistently backed moratorium
motions since  and is now a leading anti-whaling nation, insisting that no
kind of commercial whaling should be permitted. The purpose of this paper is to
examine why the UK altered its policy on whaling and whale conservation in the
s and to shed light on the decision-making processes that affected
government whaling policy in this pivotal period.
Keywords: International Whaling Commission, the United Kingdom, whaling,
Friends of the Earth.
1. Introduction
All commercial whaling has been banned since the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) introduced a commercial whaling moratorium in 	.
Although the member nations of the IWC agreed to use a revised catch-limit
calculation method in , no agreement was reached on an international
inspection and verification system. This has prevented the IWC from resuming
commercial whaling activities.
The moratorium proposal was first tabled at the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in  under the initiative of the United
States. The moratorium proposal was one of the highlights of the conference and
was passed by an overwhelming majority of votes. Although the IWC initially
rejected the recommendation, it gradually tightened whaling regulatory
measures before finally adopting an indefinite commercial whaling moratorium
in 	.
Since the UNCHE, the UK has consistently pledged its support for US-
initiated proposals to prohibit commercial whaling and it is now one of the
leading anti-whaling nations in the IWC. Given that the UK has both participated


in and shown sympathy for commercial whaling activities in the past, its position
on whaling raises a number of questions. Why did the UK change its policy in
? What concerns occupied its bureaucrats and scientists in the s? How
has UK whale conservation policy evolved thereafter? Although numerous
articles have dealt with international whaling policy in the s, the exploration
of British whale conservation policy in this period has been minimal. This paper
examines UK whaling politics at the international level, particularly in the IWC
 as well as domestic measures prohibiting the importation of whale products
into the UK to shed light on the UK government’s internal decision-making
processes.
2. Whaling regulation at the international level
2.1 The IWC and whaling regulation from 1946 until the 1960s
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling was negotiated and
adopted by  states during the IWC of 	. The Convention consists of 
articles, which stipulate the function and the mandate of the IWC, and the
Schedule which provides for concrete regulatory measures. The IWC initially
comprised a Finance and Administration Committee, a Technical Committee and
a Scientific Committee. Proposals for amendments of the Schedule were
considered by the Scientific Committee, discussed at the Technical Committee
and tabled for adoption at the plenary.
 Now, as in the past, each member country
is represented by a commissioner, who is assisted by experts and advisers.
Recommendations to the contracting governments and changes to the Rule of
Procedures can be adopted by a simple majority but amendments to the Schedule
must be supported by three quarters of the votes.
The main whaling ground in 	 was the Antarctic Ocean, where fleets from
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union and the UK conducted their
operations. The IWC set a total catch limit under the Blue Whale Unit (BWU)
system, in which one blue whale was equal to two fin whales, two-and-a-half
humpback whales or six sei whales. The whaling conference held in  had
adopted 	 BWU as the total catch limit in the Antarctic Ocean and the IWC
initially inherited this quota. Although many scientists noticed the rapid and
severe depletion in the population of great whales in the s, the IWC reduced
the catch quota by no more than  BWU and did little to protect whales from
over-exploitation. This was because scientific knowledge of whales was as yet
inadequate and scientists from whaling nations refrained from recommending
drastic cuts at the Scientific Committee, since their respective whaling industries
opposed such measures (Sanada a: 
).
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A special meeting of the IWC held in  redressed this problem to some
extent. The IWC had set up a special committee of scientists, drawn from
countries not engaged in Antarctic whaling, in  under the initiative of the UK
and the US. Reports published by this special committee presented its estimates
of whale populations to show the devastation of whale populations in the
Antarctic Ocean and to call for drastic action. The IWC special meeting in 
paid heed to these reports, reducing the catch quota to  BWU (Sanada 	).
Further catch quota reductions were intended to arrest the depletion of whale
populations. However, regulatory measures have since proved to be insufficient
for reasons relating to four main factors:
 ) Continued use of the BWU management system to set the catch quota.
Although the Scientific Committee repeatedly recommended that the
BWU limit should be abolished and replaced by total numerical quotas
for the different species, whaling nations remained firmly opposed to
such quotas.
	 ) Inadequacy of scientific knowledge. When severe depletion of blue and
humpback whale populations prompted the IWC to prohibit the
slaughter of these species in the mid-s, whaling nations simply
targeted sei, fin and sperm whales instead. The discovery of new
scientific knowledge about the age determination of fin whales prompted
some scientists to insist that catch quota reductions in the latter half of
the s were too lenient to prevent fin whale numbers from decreasing
to a dangerously low level. A debate over population estimates ensued
between US and Canadian scientists, who recommended total catch
quota reduction, and Japanese scientists, who refuted the need for
further reductions (Sanada 	
b: ).
 ) Circumvention of IWC regulations by member countries. As the IWC
reduced catch quotas in the Antarctic Ocean over the years, Japan and
the Soviet Union intensified the slaughter of whales in the North Pacific,
where there was no regulation of catch limits under the IWC. Even
though Iwao Fujita, Japanese Commissioner to the IWC from 
 to 
,
admitted that whaling in the Pacific was “surely excessive” (Fujita :
), quota regulation in the North Pacific under the IWC was delayed
until 
 owing to conflict over national quotas between Japan and the
Soviet Union. Japanese whaling companies further circumvented IWC
prohibitions by carrying out whaling operations in non-member
countries (Sanada 	
b: ).
 ) Under-reporting of catch sizes. The Soviet Union routinely under-
reported its whaling catch statistics and slaughtered threatened species
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such as humpbacks. Other whaling nations were aware that illegal
hunting was taking place but did not broach the issue in the IWC because
they lacked definitive evidence. Japanese coastal whalers also routinely
under-reported their catch of sperm whales (Kondo and Kasuya ;
Kondo ). An attempt by IWC member nations to establish an
international observer scheme to prevent this kind of deception
foundered when the Soviet Union repeatedly raised trivial objections,
leading the negotiations to a dead end.
2.2 British whaling policy before the UNCHE
The UK was a leading whaling nation before World War II owing to an expansion
in its pelagic whaling activities in the Antarctic Ocean in the s. The IWC
secretariat was located in the UK for this reason. Although the UK resumed
whaling operations after the war, increased competition caused by the over-
exploitation of the whale population in the Antarctic Ocean meant that the
British whaling industry’s obsolete factory ships lost out to newcomers Japan and
the Soviet Union. The UK gradually reduced its fleets, finally selling its last
whaling factory ship to a Japanese whaling company in . After the cessation
of hunting operations, interest in whaling decreased and British whaling policy
was increasingly determined by a small number of scientists and bureaucrats
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO). These British decision makers on whaling
acknowledged that “it is abundantly clear that catch limits in the past have
been over-generous and that the [International Whaling] Commission’s aim to
secure the conservation and rational exploitation of whale stocks has not been
achieved”. To rectify this situation, the UK supported the lowest catch limit
among proposals tabled in the IWC. Presumably, as the UK no longer had an
economic interest in whaling, it was easy for UK decision makers to advocate the
adoption of stricter protective measures for great whales.
2.3 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the
British response
Concerns over whale conservation were increasingly voiced by environ-
mentalists in the US from the late s., The Secretary of the Interior, Walter J.
Hickel, responded with an announcement in 	 that eight species of great
whales
 would be listed as endangered under the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of . In 	, the US introduced a domestic ban on
commercial whaling and an import ban on whale products. The last whaling
company in the US ceased operations in the same year.
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The IWC annual meeting, held in late June , received extensive media
coverage in the US, partly because the meeting was held there. The American
delegation urged the introduction of an international observer scheme,
species-by-species quotas and more conservative catch limits. Although member
nations of the IWC agreed in principle to introduce quotas by species, the
implementation of this measure was delayed for procedural reasons: the countries
concerned were only able to agree on the framework for the international
observer scheme and to initiate negotiations enforcing the scheme. The reduction
of the catch limit adopted at the meeting was deemed lenient by the US
delegation. The New York Times criticized the outcome as a “dismal fiasco,” and
the result of the annual meeting was greeted with disdain in the US. The US
House of Representatives subsequently adopted a unanimous resolution calling
for a -year moratorium on all commercial whaling.
In the months that followed, the Soviet Union employed transparent delaying
tactics to impede negotiations over the international observer scheme before
further jeopardizing the scheme by allowing its whaling fleets to set sail to the
Antarctic Ocean without international observers on board in October . US
officials from the Council on Environmental Quality strongly urged the IWC to
enforce monitoring in the light of this development and the US Interior Secretary
publicly announced support for a commercial whaling moratorium. Finally, in
January , the US Secretary of State for Commerce decided to propose or
support a moratorium on commercial whaling at the upcoming UNCHE (Sanada
b).
Support for whale conservation had been growing in the UK over the same
time period. A BBC Horizon program about whaling aired on March  
“aroused enormous public indignation”	 by portraying whales as under threat
and highlighting the fact that whales were processed into cat food. Noting that
the US had already banned the import of whale products, the narrator suggested
that Britain and other nations should follow suit. The Horizon program attracted
attention from J. R. A. Bottomley, who was the Deputy Under Secretary of State
and a high-ranking official in the FCO. After watching the TV program,
Bottomley suggested to F. M. Kearns at MAFF: “I should. . . like to see us prohibit
the importation of whale products into the United Kingdom and, if possible,
persuade other European countries to follow suit.” Kearns observed that,
although the IWC had previously “allowed [whale stocks] to reach a very low
level before taking any effective action to conserve them”, catch levels in the
Antarctic had been significantly reduced in recent years. Adding that “the
extinction of great whales is not a foregone conclusion”, Kearns objected that “the




assumption that without it the whale stock will be extinguished”. Kearns ended
by proposing that MAFF should hold consultations to consider the issue further.
MAFF hosted several meetings with the FCO and a final consultation was
scheduled to be held in mid June just after the UNCHE. Up until this point, MAFF
officials were still maintaining that the British delegation should oppose the
proposal for a whaling moratorium in the IWC meeting on the grounds that it was
unnecessary. The comments of one MAFF bureaucrat to a Japanese embassy
official, that “a -year total prohibition of whaling proposal by the United
States. . . is scientifically groundless and, I have to say, that it is nonsensical”
mirrored the views held by many MAFF officials and showed sympathy with the
Japanese position.
Aware that a Japanese amendment, which proposed to limit the scope of the
moratorium to endangered species, was attracting a fair degree of support from
other countries, the US pursued the moratorium proposal more vigorously. The
US argued that, although the concept of establishing moratoria on endangered
species was familiar to the IWC, its application at this stage would be a case of too
little, too late. The US instructed all diplomatic posts located in participating
countries to enlist support for a -year moratorium on all commercial whaling
shortly before the UNCHE began. Intense lobbying for the moratorium proposal
continued during the conference, with Maurice Strong, Secretary-General of the
UNCHE, appearing at a non-governmental organization-sponsored rally for whale
conservation held near the conference venue, stressing that the success of the
conference hinged on the adoption of the moratorium resolution. A crowd of
demonstrators marched through the streets near the conference hall on the next
day and a -year moratorium proposal rapidly gained momentum among
participating countries.
As the atmosphere of anti-whaling sentiment mounted, government
representatives previously in favor of the Japanese position suddenly began to
adopt a cautious attitude. Peter Walker, the UK Secretary of State for the
Environment, and attendee at the UNCHE, concluded that it was difficult to
oppose or abstain on the moratorium resolution. In a telephone conversation
with MAFF Minister James Prior, Walker and Prior agreed that “the UK should
abstain if possible but vote in favor if it was necessary to do so”. In the event,
the UK decided to support the US-led resolution on a -year cessation of all
commercial whaling. This non-legally binding resolution was subsequently
adopted by an overwhelming majority, with  votes in favor, none against and
three abstentions. At an inter-departmental meeting held just after the UNCHE,
the FCO stressed that “the UK delegation should certainly not come out in flat
opposition to the United States’ moratorium proposal”.	 A draft position paper
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previously prepared by MAFF officials had instructed the UK to “positively
oppose” the moratorium: this was quickly amended under the terms of new brief,
to “make it clear that the UK delegation should support the US proposal, in the
light of the Stockholm vote [on a -year moratorium]”.
As a -year moratorium recommendation had been adopted by over-
whelming majority at the UNCHE, the US tried to carry a temporary moratorium
proposal at the IWC meeting held just after the UNCHE in an effort to enforce the
recommendation. The motion for a -year moratorium received little support at
the IWC, however. The Scientific Committee pointed out that “a blanket
moratorium on whaling could not be justified scientifically” (IWC a) and the
Japanese delegation argued that it “is all too obvious that a proposal for a total
ban on the taking of all whale species. . . has no sound scientific basis whatsoever”
(IWC b: ), citing the results of the Scientific Committee. The proposal was
defeated at the plenary with four countries (Argentina, Mexico, the US and the
UK) in favor, six against and four abstentions.
2.4 The adoption of the New Management Procedure and the UK
The UK supported the moratorium proposal both in the UNCHE and the IWC,
despite the opinions of some MAFF officials and Ray Gambell, a well known
British cetologist, who had served on the Scientific Committee of the IWC and
who thought that a moratorium on all whale species was unnecessary. A MAFF
bureaucrat opined that although the US advocated a moratorium on the grounds
that “time is needed for scientific research to develop more accurate knowledge of
each species and its relationship to the ecosystem”, this was “really a dishonest
plea since. . . if we waited on completely accurate knowledge, we should never
exploit anything”. The same official urged that “we should explain to the US
delegation that we do not feel that we could again vote in favour of a
moratorium”. The FCO reminded MAFF that the FCO “would find such a
reversal of policy difficult” as “we already have a number of current difficulties
relating to international fishery organizations”. The FCO asked MAFF “to avoid
voting against the American moratorium proposal or abstaining in such a way
that it was clear to all concerned that we have effectively withdrawn from the
position we adopted last year.” In addition, US officials approached their UK
counterparts and explained that the moratorium proposal was an “opening bid” to
win concessions from whaling nations. The final word on the matter came in
June  from the Minister of State for MAFF, who instructed the British
delegation to support the moratorium proposal.	
At the  IWC annual meeting, the moratorium motion received eight




the UK and the US) compared with four votes in the previous year. While five
countries (Ireland, Japan, Norway, South Africa and the Soviet Union) voted
against this moratorium proposal thereby depriving it of the required
three-quarters majority the IWC passed a motion to phase out the fin whale
catch in three years as well as further catch limit reductions for other whales.
Objections promptly followed. Strong opposition from the Japanese whaling
industry led Japan to lodge objections to the phasing out of the harvest of fin
whales and to the catch quota for sperm as well as minke whales, and the Soviet
Union soon followed suit with the same objection. The US responded angrily
with a strong protest lodged by the US government in October followed by a
boycott of Japanese products by NGOs active in the US, such as the Friends of the
Earth and the National Audubon Society, one of the country’s oldest and largest
conservation organizations. Hundreds of letters of protest were sent to Japanese
embassies and consulates in the US and the US Department of State. Backed by
a growing anti-whaling movement, the US encouraged other member nations to
support the moratorium proposal as they had in the previous year (Sanada ).
Before the 	 IWC annual meeting, officials from MAFF asked the UK
delegation to balance three issues: the need to act consistently with previous
votes by the UK and support for the US at the UNCHE; the need to maintain an
effective IWC by retaining Japan and the Soviet Union as members; and the need
to act in accordance with the advice from the Scientific Committee of the IWC.
MAFF officials considered it likely that if a moratorium resolution was passed,
Japan and the Soviet Union would simply continue as they had done the previous
year, that is, they would object to the decision by the IWC and would reach
bilateral agreement on catch quotas. Fearing that Japan and/or the Soviet Union
would leave the IWC and that the commission would cease to have any practical
importance, MAFF officials proposed that “the UK delegation should continue in
form to support the idea of moratorium but behind the scenes they should
continue to impress upon the USA the vital importance of decisions accepted by
the Japanese and the USSR”.
Ultimately, a change in attitude on the part of the US delegation saved both
MAFF officials and the UK delegation from the need for further backstage
diplomacy. Recognizing that the moratorium would not be passed through the
IWC because Japan, Norway, South Africa and the Soviet Union would oppose it
and a three-quarters majority would not be achieved, the US delegation began to
hope instead for “a compromise which would allow them to maintain their
moratorium proposal on the surface, while allowing it to be superseded by a more
moderate system of automatic moratoria on stocks reaching over-exploited
levels”. A timely proposal tabled by Australia at this juncture offered all parties
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a way out of the impasse. The proposal was to divide whale stocks into three
categories over-exploited, fully exploited, and under-exploited rather than
impose a blanket moratorium of the nature proposed by the US. According to
this Australian amendment, the definition of the above three categories would be
left to the Scientific Committee but whaling would not be permitted on any
stocks that the Scientific Committee designated as over-exploited. The UK urged
the US to accept the proposal and the US delegation at length deferred to the
Australian amendment as a compromise.
The Australian proposal was adopted with  countries in favor and two
(Japan and the Soviet Union) against at the  IWC annual meeting. The
categorization scheme it introduced was hereafter called the New Management
Procedure (NMP) and has been applied since 	. The two objectors acquiesced
to the IWC’s decision. The Japanese Commissioner Iwao Fujita, later stated that
“we [the Japanese delegation] decided that further conflict between Japan and the
United States should be avoided”. The Soviet Union was also in a conciliatory
mood, at least on an informal basis. Its delegates hinted to the British delegation
that they would have supported the proposal, or at least abstained from voting
against it, had they had time to get revised instruction from Moscow.

3. The UK anti-whaling movement and government initiatives
at the domestic level
3.1 Friends of the Earth and the anti-whaling movement in the UK
A number of environmental NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, had paid
increasing attention to the conservation of great whales from the mid 
s.
Their cause was further strengthened from the 
s by the active involvement of
Friends of the Earth (FoE), Project Jonah and Greenpeace. In the UK, the role of
leading the anti-whaling movement was taken on by FoE, inspired by the 
-year
moratorium recommendation tabled in the UNCHE in . FoE held a public
demonstration outside the conference hall at which the IWC met in London in
.
The British government responded to increasing concern over the plight of
whales by introducing an import ban on products from baleen whales, such as
blue, fin, humpback, sei and minke. This prohibitive measure was not extended
to sperm whales, which are toothed and not baleen whales. Sperm whales were
not considered to be an endangered species and there was a certain amount of
demand for products such as sperm oil, spermaceti wax and ambergris to be used
as lubricants, tanning agents and in perfume. FoE was not satisfied with the ban
and continued to appeal for an all-out import ban, lobbying Members of
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Parliament as well as journalists. FoE argued that the so-called Maximum
Sustainable Yield (MSY) theory, which the IWC used to determine catch limits of
whale populations, was limited owing to the lack of critical data and the fact that
it did not take into account the interaction between other species in the marine
ecosystem. FoE published a campaign manual and contributed articles to
academic journals in which it described the situation of whales and called for
their protection (FoE ; King and Burton ). FoE sought to reach as large an
audience as possible with its anti-whaling campaign, posting advertisements in
newspapers and holding a charity concert starring David Bowie (Lamb : 
). These campaigns resulted in the submission of an Early Day Motion in the
House of Commons in January  calling for an import ban on all sperm whale
products. While this motion was initiated mainly by Liberals, it gathered as
many as  signatures from backbenchers on all sides of the House. The Leader
of the House Michael Foot, registered his sympathy for the cause by saying that
if he were free to do so, he would have signed the motion himself.
Faced with the surge of interest in whaling and whale conservation,
government officials from MAFF and the Department of Industry defended the
use of sperm whale products on the grounds that while the sperm whale was not
considered to be endangered, account must be taken of the industries using sperm
oil. They argued that the leather industry would be hard hit economically if
sperm oil were banned because of its dependence on sperm oil as a softening
agent. It was also argued that banning sperm oil would harm the engineering
industry, which used it as an additive. Although sperm oil could be replaced by
other products in each case, it was cheaper than the available substitutes. The
Department of Industry commissioned a leather industry association to produce
a report on the use of sperm oil. This report, published in August , recognized
that sperm oil could be replaced by other products in some applications but
concluded that there was no single product that could replace sperm oil in leather
treatment and, in some cases, there was no substitute for it at all (British Leather
Manufacturers’ Research Association ).
3.2 Import ban on sperm whale products by the Ministry of Defence
In these circumstances, the Ministry of Defence, which was not concerned with
wildlife conservation matters, took steps to strengthen regulation relating to
sperm whales. In , a Member of Parliament inquired whether the Defence
Ministry purchased products that were treated with sperm oil. Dr John Gilbert,
Minister of State for Defence and a member of the World Wildlife Fund, took an
interest in the matter, sending a reply to the MP and ordering his staff to
investigate the issue. Upon finding that almost all products purchased by the
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Ministry could be substituted by products that were not processed with sperm oil,
the Defence Ministry informed the leather industry that it would prohibit, to the
maximum extent possible, the use of sperm whale oil in the manufacture of
products purchased under Ministry contracts. When the leather industry asked
the Defence Ministry to rescind this decision on the grounds that it was in conflict
with the Department of Industry, which allowed the use of sperm oil, the
Defence Ministry instead explained to the Department of Industry that this action
was not inconsistent with the Department of Industry policy. The aim of the
measure, it claimed, was to protect the Defence Ministry from any difficulties that
might arise when stocks of sperm oil became scarce. This reasoning gained
approval from other department officials. In June 	, when the annual meeting
of the IWC was held in London, Dr Gilbert announced publicly that his ministry
would not buy products processed with sperm whale oil.
Gilbert’s announcement coincided with another Early Day Motion, submitted
by  MPs from the ruling Labour party and the opposition Conservative party,
calling for support for an indefinite whaling moratorium proposal tabled by the
Panamanian delegation at the 	 IWC annual meeting. While the moratorium
proposal was ultimately withdrawn by Panama, the IWC voted to prohibit sei
whale slaughter in the Southern Hemisphere and reduce the catch quota for
sperm whales in the same area. Further, John Beddington, lecturer in population
biology at the University of York, contended at the Scientific Committee of the
IWC that the pregnancy rate of sperm whales in the Pacific Ocean was decreasing
and that harvesting should be banned (Beddington 	). The IWC therefore
decided to hold a special meeting to set a catch limit for this species in the
Pacific.	
In light of the growing anti-whaling sentiment and the strengthening of
regulatory measures internationally and domestically, MAFF minister Edward
Bishop, Defence Minister John Gilbert and Industry Minister Alan Williams held
a meeting with other concerned ministers to discuss the possibility of moving
toward a ban on imports of sperm oil into the UK. After discussions among the
ministers of Defence, Industry, and Agriculture, it was agreed that officials of the
three departments would debate the issue thoroughly then coordinate and
expedite the research that was being carried out into commercially viable
substitutes for sperm oil.
 The Department of Industry funded a second leather
industry association review of replacements for sperm oil and a report was
completed by the end of 	. The results were similar to those of the first review
and offered little prospect of the industry making immediate progress in finding
commercially viable alternatives to sperm oil. In response, Dr Gilbert expressed
disappointment, saying that “the conclusions. . . give a misleading impression that
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all sperm oil substitutes are unsuccessful” despite the fact that the Ministry of
Defence had been assured by the supply leather product suppliers that they could
provide, with few exceptions, goods manufactured without sperm whale oil at
virtually no extra cost. MAFF officials were also frustrated by the result of the
report and requested that the Department of Industry should reconsider the
findings of the report in the light of the Ministry of Defence’s findings.
3.3 Transformation of British whaling policy
A critical turning point for British whaling policy came in May , when the
Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher won the general election. After the
election, Conservative and Labour MPs submitted a motion urging the
government to ban the import of all whale products and to work to secure a
worldwide ban on the slaughter of whales. Public support for anti-whaling
legislation had been growing for some months: environmental NGOs, including
FoE, the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace, had intensified their anti-whaling
activities in the UK. Greenpeace, in particular, had been hugely successful in
creating media events that captured the public’s attention. This may partly
explain why the motion received wide support from MPs across the political
spectrum.
The newly appointed Secretary of State for Trade John Nott, responded to
these developments in June  by suggesting to Michael Heseltine, Secretary of
State for the Environment, that the British government should seek to promote a
European Community ban on the import of sperm whale products or, in the
absence of Community agreement, take unilateral action. While Keith Joseph, the
Secretary of State for Industry, took a negative view of this proposal, Heseltine
replied that he would “strongly support” Nott’s initiative, saying that an import
ban could be justified on the grounds that the IWC quotas were not low enough.	
After further government consultation, the UK representative at the IWC finally
proclaimed the UK’s decision to support a commercial whaling moratorium and
seek an EC-wide ban on sperm whale products in an opening statement at the
IWC annual meeting in July  (IWC : 	
).
Members of the leather industry criticized the policy change as a top-down
decision made by cabinet secretaries, saying they had not been consulted during
discussions held before the new policy was decided and had learned about it only
from TV broadcasts. After the annual meeting of the IWC, government officials
held a meeting with representatives of the leather industry. Inquiries from
industry representatives at the session as to why the government had changed its
policy so suddenly met with the response that the ministerial decision had
already been made and there would be no room for further discussion. With no
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choice other than to accept the change in policy, the industry representatives
requested that the government should seek an EC-wide or worldwide ban on
sperm oil because without it the British leather industry would suffer a
competitive disadvantage.
The Department of the Environment was in charge of matters relating to a
ban on sperm oil. The department initially insisted on prompt action and said
that should it fail to get agreement for a ban from the rest of the EC, it should
impose a unilateral UK ban before Christmas . However, opposition from the
leather industry and the Department of Industry delayed this schedule: it was
January  before the Council of the European Community finally adopted a
regulation prohibiting the import of all whale products for commercial
purposes.
4. Conclusion
This paper has focused on several watershed events that led the UK to change its
position on whaling and whale conservation in the s. Initially, MAFF
officials concerned directly with whaling policy held a negative view on a
moratorium proposal advocated by the US in the UNCHE as well as the IWC,
despite their admittance that the regulatory measures of the IWC were not severe
enough to prevent great whale numbers from decreasing dangerously. MAFF
officials started to appear increasingly isolated, however. When the moratorium
motion gained momentum at the UNCHE in 	, the Secretaries of State for
Environment and Agriculture decided in a telephone conversation to support the
proposal without prior consultation with MAFF officials and the British
delegation continued to uphold the proposal at the IWC meetings. The
contradiction between ministry support for international measures in some
government departments and internal opposition from fisheries bureaucrats was
eventually resolved without ever being given full expression by the adoption of
the New Management Procedure at the  IWC annual meeting.
A number of factors had played a role in engineering the changing attitudes
that transformed UK government policy in this key period. Environmental
NGOs, especially Friends of the Earth, made vigorous calls for an import ban on
all whale products and succeeded in rousing public opinion against whaling,
thereby leading a significant number of MPs to take up the issue. Scientists also
played a key role: IWC regulations were strengthened year on year based on the
arguments of many scientists, who claimed that existing measures were
insufficient to conserve the whale population. These views were widely accepted




overwhelming majority. The Ministry of Defence was another key player in the
developments that took place in the s: although the leather industry and
government officials from the Department of Industry insisted that an import ban
on sperm whale products was impossible because no substitute was available, the
Ministry of Defence showed that virtually all the products manufactured using
sperm oil could be made without it, thereby decisively undermining the leather
industry’s objections. Finally, a change of government to the Thatcher
administration led the UK to seek an EC-wide import ban on sperm whale
products and a moratorium on all commercial whaling in the IWC. These British
initiatives brought about the first EC regulation against whaling and helped form
the anti-whaling stance that prevails today among member nations of the
European Union, which continues to act as a bloc in the IWC, insisting on the
prohibition of commercial whaling and urging Japan to stop its so-called
“scientific” whaling.

Disputes on whaling and whale conservation are no less charged today than they
were in the s. Japan, Iceland and Norway continue their whaling operations
either in the name of science, as in Japan’s case, or under commercial exception, as
in the case of Iceland and Norway. These three countries’ activities take place in
defiance of repeated recommendations from the IWC calling for their
discontinuance and strong criticism from a large number of scientists, who point
out that Japanese “scientific” whaling does not have a sufficiently scientific basis
(Gales et al. ). Backed by anti-whaling sentiment in western countries, a
number of environmental groups such as Sea Shepherd adopt radical maneuvers
to prevent whalers from hunting. IWC meetings, unlike other international
forums that negotiate environmental matters, frequently end in pandemonium
with precious little being achieved. Efforts by pro- and anti-whaling nations in
the IWC to start negotiations under an inter-sessional working group to resolve
the impasse paralysing IWC proceedings remain stymied by the inability of
participating parties to overcome their differences and reach a compromise.
Pro-whaling nations continue to call for an end to the ban on commercial whaling,
the adoption of a moderate supervision scheme under the IWC and the
continuance of “scientific” whaling without any kind of restriction. Anti-whaling
members continue to contend that the resumption of commercial whaling should
not be permitted without exceedingly stringent international controls
administered by the IWC and insist that “scientific” whaling is a loophole that
should be closed. Finally, the UK holds firm on the anti-whaling position it
adopted in the s, when MPs first acted against whaling with the backing of
British whaling policy in the 1970s
	
their constituencies. UK public opinion on whaling has not changed substantially
since the s. As long as the EU countries in the IWC act as a bloc and the UK
has a considerable voice within the EU, the position of the EU will not change to
allow commercial whaling unless radical compromise proposals are obtained first
from whaling nations on contentious issues such as the complete cessation of
so-called “scientific” whaling.
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Notes
 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South
Africa, the UK, the US and the Soviet Union.
 The IWC set up a Conservation Committee at the IWC meeting in Berlin in .
 Although the Technical Committee has not been abolished formally, it has not met in recent years.
	 Her Majesty’s Government, ‘International Whaling Commission: rd Annual Meeting ’, n. d., , MAF /
, National Archives, London.

 The listed whale species were right, bowhead, gray, blue, fin, sei, humpback and sperm. The IWC had already
prohibited the killing of right, bowhead, gray, blue and humpback whales.
 New York Times, July  .
 Letter from Maurice H. Stans (Secretary of Commerce) to William P. Rogers (Secretary of State), January 	 ,
file INCO WHALES WHALING 	 , box , Subject Numeric Files, Record Group 
, National Archives II,
College Park, Maryland.
 Memorandum from D. P. A. Gilbert, July , MAF / , NA.
 Telegram No. A, London to Washington D. C.,  March , file WHALES A , box , Subject
Numeric Files, Record Group 
, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
 Letter from J. R. A. Bottomley to F. M. Kearns,  March , MAF / 
, NA.
 Letter from F. M. Kearns to J. R. A. Bottomley,  March , MAF / 
, NA.
 Ibid.
 Telegram No. , London to Tokyo, May , file name: Kokuren Ningen Kanky¶Kaigi / Sy¶gy¶ hogei kinshi
mondai (UNCHE: Problems on a Ban on Commercial Whaling), created date of the file:  May , Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan (available under the Information Disclosure Act).
	 Telegram No. 	 from Washington D. C. to All Embassies,  June , file INCO WHALE  , box ,
Subject Numeric Files, Record Group 
, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

 Telegram No.  from Stockholm to Tokyo,  June , file name: Kokuren Ningen Kanky¶ Kaigi / Sy¶gy¶
hogei kinshi mondai (UNCHE: Problems on a Ban on Commercial Whaling), created date of the file:  May ,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (available under the Information Disclosure Act).
 Memorandum from W. R. Small to Graham,  June , FCO / , NA. See also ‘UN Conference on Human
Environment, Stockholm, 
 June ’,  July , FCO / , NA.
 Memorandum from M. Elliott to Campbell, 	 June , FCO / 
, PRO.
 Her Majesty’s Government, ‘International Whaling Commission: Standing Brief (Draft)’,  May , MAF /

, NA.




 Letter from J. Graham (MAFF) to Burne,  June , MAF / , NA.
 Memorandum from H. A. Dudgeon to Wright, ‘International Whaling Commission’,  June , FCO / , NA.
 Letter from J. Q. Davies (Marine and Transport Department, FCO) to P. Pooley (MAFF), 	 June , MAF /
, NA.
 Telegram No. 	, London to Washington D. C.,  June , file WHALE  , box , Subject Numeric
Files, Record Group 
, National Archives II , College Park, Maryland.
 Memorandum from A. R. Burne to Maude,  June , MAF / , NA.

 Amerika-kyoku Hokubei-daiichi-ka (First North America Division, North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs), ‘Hogei mondai to Nichibei kankei (Whaling issues and Japan-American relations)’,  July , file
name: Kokusai Hogei Torishimari Jy¶yaku Kankei Ikken, Hogei Iinkai Kankei, Dai  Kan (International Convention
on the Regulation of Whaling, IWC, Vol.  ), CD-ROM No. B’ , Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, Tokyo.
 Fisheries III Division, MAFF, ‘Submission to the Minister of State: International Whaling Commission
Proposed Worldwide Moratorium on Commercial Whaling’,  June , MAF / , NA.
 Fisheries III B ‘International Whaling Commission: Report of Annual Meeting, 	 June ’, July , MAF
/ , NA.
	 Ibid.
 Asahi Shinbun,  June  (evening edition).
 Letter from J. R. Moss to Burne,  July , MAF / , NA.
 Early Day Motion No. , ‘Moratorium on Whaling’, Thursday 
 January . Government officials considered
that “(t)he early day motion had undoubtedly been inspired by Friends of the Earth” (see Memorandum, MAFF,
“Early Day Motion: Background Note,” n. d., MAF / , NA).
 K. J. A. Brown, ‘Minister of State’s Meeting with Mr Alan Williams MP (MoS, Industry) and Mr Denis Howell MP
(MoS, Environment):  June ’,  June , MAF / 	, NA; House of Commons Hansard: Extract from
Business Statement, Thursday 	 November , MAF / 	, NA.
 Reply from John Gilbert to Stephen Ross,  May , MAF / 	, NA.
 Letter from R. F. W. Phillips (Ministry of Defence) to Guy Reaks (Director, British Leather Federation), ‘Sperm
Whale Oil’,  October , MAF / 	, NA.

 Letter from Guy Reaks (Director, British Leather Federation) to R. F. W. Phillips (Ministry of Defence),  October
, MAF / 	, NA.
 C. J. Marsh (CT  B, Department of Industry), ‘Note of a Meeting Held at .  AM on Tuesday, 
 November 
in Room  Millbank Tower to Discuss Sperm Whales and Sperm Oil’,  November , MAF / 	, NA.
 Early Day Motion 	, ‘Slaughter of Whales’, 	 June 	.
	 At the special meeting, the sperm whale catch in the Pacific Ocean was decreased from  to 	.
 Memorandum from B. J. Harding to Dobrin, ‘Sperm Whale Oil’,  July 	, MAF / 	
, NA.
 Memorandum from B. J. Harding to Gurd, ‘Sperm Whale Oil’,  July 	, MAF / 	, NA.
 Letter from John Gilbert (Minister of State, MOD) to Alan Williams (Minister of State, Department of Industry),
 December 	, MAF / 	
, NA.
 Letter from A. Church (Fisheries Division IIIB, MAFF) to Kelsey, ‘British Leather Manufacturers’ Research
Association’s Draft on Investigating of Sperm Oil Analogues for Use in the Lubrication of Leather’,  December 	,
MAF / 	
, NA.
 In December 	, several Greenpeace members supported by Friends of the Earth were arrested in an attempt to
stop a Danish ship from landing sperm whale oil at Glasgow. In February , the World Wildlife Fund gathered
around  schoolchildren’s signatures against whaling. The Greenpeace action was reported in The Guardian ( 
December 	) and Daily Express ( 
 December 	). The World Wildlife Fund petition was reported as far abroad
as Japan in the Asahi Shinbun (  February ; evening edition).
 Early Day Motion No. , ‘Ban on Import of Whale Products’ ( May , MAF / 	, NA) obtained 
signatures from MPs. Some  early day motions were submitted between the / session of the House of
Commons to the /	 session. Only 	 of them including the ban on import of whale products received more
than  signatures (House of Commons Information Office 	).
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 Letter from Keith Joseph (Secretary of State, Department of Industry) to John Nott (Secretary of State,
Department of Trade),  July , MAF 	/ 
	, NA.
 Letter from Michael Heseltine (Secretary of State, DoE) to John Nott (Secretary of State, Department of Trade), 

July , MAF 	/ 
	, NA.
 A. Barber (CT  b, Department of Industry), ‘Note of a Meeting at the British Leather Federation, London,  July
’, n. d., MAF 	/ 
	, NA.
 Ibid.
 Memorandum from R. J. Packer (MAFF) to Harding, ‘Import of Sperm Whale Products’, 
 July , MAF 	/

	, NA.
	 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
/  of 	 January  on common rules for imports of whales or other cetacean
products.
 Memorandum from W. R. Small to Graham,  June  (FCO / 
	, NA); Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
‘UN Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm,  June ’,  July , FCO / 
	, NA.
 Article  of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling stipulates that any IWC member
country may unilaterally grant a special permit authorizing the slaughter of whales for scientific research and that
the killing of whales in accordance with the provision of this article shall be exempt from the operation of the
Convention. Although commercial whaling has been prohibited, Japan continues to kill more than 			 whales
annually for “scientific research” despite severe criticism from many member nations of the IWC.
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